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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
WANDA MARTHA SHORT
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

Case No.
12225

RALPH ARLIND SHORT,
Defendant and Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
The Plaintiff Appellee answers Defendant Appellant's brief occasioned by the trial court's refusal
to modify a Divorce Decree at the request of Defendant Appellant. Defendant appellant asked the
trial court to absolve him from the necessity of paying alimony.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

The trial court denied Defendant appellant'1
motion to reduce alimony from $75.00 per month tl
$1.00 per month.
RELIEF SOUGHT

Plaintiff appellee asks the Court to affirm thf
Order of the Trial Court ref using to reduce alimony
payments from $75.00 per month to $1.00 per month.

The Court should further award judgment
against the Defendant appellant in favor of Plaintiff appellee for reasonable attorney's fees and costs
incurred in this appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

This is a contested divorce case. On 4 January,
1967, the Trial Court found that the Defendant ap·
pellant treated the Plaintiff appellee "in a cruel and
abusive manner" [R p 32] and granted her a divorce.

Defendant asked the Court to modify the Decree
by terminating his obligation to pay alimony in Sep·
tember of the same year the divorce was granted1967. Motion denied.

The following year Defendant made a similar
motion. Motion denied by Order issued 23 Novem·
ber, 1968.

On the 29th day of May, 1970, the Defendant
was asking for the same modification of the Deere€
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of Divorce refused twice before as above said. At
this time the sworn affidavits before the Court, incident to this instant last request, together with the
record as above said, indicated that the Defendant
was employed by the same employer as at the time of
the divorce and that he had increased his monthly
earnings from $575.00 [R p 32 and p 541 at the time
of the divorce to $615.00 [R p 62].
The Court further found that the wi£e was not
working at the time of the divorce "but it was reasonably anticipated at that time that it would be
, necessary for her to work as she was awarded only
$75.00 per month alimony and $75.00 per month support money." (R p 62)
It should be noted that the Plaintiff incorporated her reply affidavit in the matter heard in November, 1968, into her reply affidavit in the instant
hearing of 1970. Thus the Court had before it all of
the facts of the divorce and the yearly attempts of
the Defendant to avoid his responsibilities under
the Court Decree.

As the Court said it anticipated, the Plaintiff
sought and obtained employment immediately after
the 1967 divorce. She was so working at the times of
the subsequent attempts by the Defendant to do away
with alimony. She recei,ved cost of living increased
in her pay from $·322 per month to $389.00. The Defendant increased his earnings as above said. Plaintiff's testimony was to the effect that her modest
raises did not keep pace with the actual rise in the
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cost of living. The last time the Defendant was in
Court and he was making $610.00 per month. This
time he was making $615.00 per month. ( R p 62).
Since the divorce the Defendant had established
himself in adequate living quarters and his living
expenses stabilized. ( R p 48) There was no claimed
change in any of this.
The Court found that there was "no material
change in circumstances of the parties" since Defendant had last asked to be relieved of alimony. In
point of fact, the record show:s no substantial change
in circumstances of the parties since the time of di· 1
vorce. The record shows substantially identical fact
situations at the instant hearing and the one that·
preceded it.
Defendant's motion to modify the Divorce De·
cree was denied for the third time since the Decree
was entered in 1967.
1

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE AWARDING OF ALIMONY AND FIX·
ING AMOUNT THEREOF ARE QUESTIONS :
EXCLUSIVELY IN THE SOUND DISCRETION
OF THE TRIAL COURT.
It is well settled law in Utah that the awarding
of alimony and fixing the amount thereof are ques·
tions, the determination of which rests within the
sound discretion of the Trial Court, and, unless it is
made to appear that there has been an abuse of dis·
cretion on the part of the Court in dealing with the
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questions, its judgment and orders granting and fix-

ing alimony will not be disturbed.

Adamson v. Adamson, 55 U 544, 188 P 635
Anderson v. Anderson, 104 U 104 138 P 2nd 252
Blair v. Blair, 40 U 306, 121 P 19
Carterv. Carter, 19 U2183, 429 P 2 35
Tremayne v. Tremayne, 116 U 483, 211 P 2nd
452
POINT II
1

THE CHANGE IN FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES TO JUSTIFY A MODIFICATION OF A
DECREE OR ORDER FOR ALIMONY MUST BE
MATERIAL AND SUBSTANTIAL.
It is well settled law in Utah that to entitle
either party in a divorce action to modification of a
decree or order of alimony such a party must claim
and prove change in circumstances such as to require, in fairness and equity, the sought change.
Hampton v. Hampton (1935) 86 U 570, 47 P
2nd 419
Hendricks v. Hendricks (1936) 91 U 553, 63 P
2d 277
Osmus v. Osmus, 114 U 216, 198 P 2d 233
Gale v. Gale, 123 U 277, 258 P 2d 986
POINT III
WHERE THERE HA VE BEEN ONE OR
MORE PREVIOUS DECISIONS ON MOTIONS
FOR MODIFICATION OF A DECREE, THE
QUESTION WHETHER THERE HAS BEEN
SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN THE CIRCUM-
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STANCES OF THE PARTIES IS DETERMINED
WITH RESPECT TO THE PERIOD COMMENC.
ING WITH THE DATE OF THE MOST RECENT
ORDER ON A MOTION FOR
AND NOT WITH RESPECT TO THE TIME
SINCE THE ORIGINAL DECREE WAS EN.
TE RED.
It is significant that the statutory authorizatio1
granting continuous jurisdiction to the courts to in.
crease or decrease alimony under changed conditiom
reads in terms of orders as well as decrees. U.C.A
30-3-5 says :

"When a decree of divorce is made thE
court may make such orders in relation to thE
xxx maintenance of the parties xxx as may be
equitable."
The Utah Supreme Court clearly interpreted
this statute in the year 1916 and has never changed
its position. The Court holds that this section was
designed to empower a court that had granted a De·
cree of Divorce and awarded alimony to increase or
decrease alimony under changed conditions alleged
by either party so as to reflect justice between the
parties. It was not intended by this section to em·
power the courts at any time to review their own
former decrees or orders respecting the allowance
of alimony upon the facts existing at the tinie they
were made.
"Although the language is general in per·
mitting 'subsequent changes and new orders'.tu
be made, yet we think it was not thereby rn·
tended that the courts could at any time review
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their own former orders on decrees respecting
the allowance of alimony xxxx
"We do not think the Legislature intended
that the courts should review the allowances
made by them for alimony in divorce proceedings, but what was intended was that, where
material new conditions have arisen after the
decrees were made, which conditions were not,
and could not have been, considered or passed
on by the courts, then, upon proper application
and proof, the courts may make 'subsequent
changes and new orders' respecting alimony
xxxx"
Cody v. Cody, (1916) 47 U 456, 154 P 952
In applying this rule of law to the instant fact
situation it is clear that the trial court could not
properly go beyond the last court order to determine
a change of circumstances. Had it done so, it would
have been reviewing its own former order respecting
alimony.
A scholarly treatise on modification of alimony
is found in A.L.R. 2nd Vol. 18. The accepted law is
restated there with reference to this point. Commencing on page 18 it reads:
"Where there have been one or more previous decisions on motions for modification of
a decree, the question whether there has been a
substantial change in the circumstances of the
parties is determined with respect to the period
commencing with the date of the most recent
order on a motion for modification and not with
respect to the time since the original decree was
entered."
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1
This is precisely the point under discussion. Tw0
cases are cited :
:
1

Pribyl v. Pribyl (1928) 250 III. App. 349
White v. White (1941) 312 Ill. App. 383,30
NE 2d 525 Abstract
1
In ruling on this identical question the Wash-1
ington Supreme Court wrote:
,I

"The order made preceding the one whicn
is now before us not having been appealed from I
is res judicata, unless there has been, since tho/'
order was entered, (emphasis added) a
change in ci1rcumstances of the parties.
v. Hudson (1941) 8 Wash 2d 114, 111
p 2d 573
This rule of law is followed in all jurisdictions r
I have taken opportunity to check. Although this
the only point raised in appellant's brief, it is notea
that he does not cite a single case in opposition to
well defined rule of law. Appellant's brief is thus
without one citation in point. For other cases invol· ·
ing the application of this accepted principle see:

Blank v. Blank, 55 Ohio App. 388 & N.E. 2d 868
Snyder v. Snyder 219 Cal. 80 25 P 2d 403
Sim's v. Sim's 34 Haw. 237, (cited in the Hud,
son case)
POINT IV
APPELLANT SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO
PAY APPELLEE REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S
FEES AND COSTS INCIDENT TO THIS AP·
PEAL.

i
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Appellant admits that the record impliies that he
/ "seeks modifications to annoy the other party or to
!'equire unnecessary payment of attorney's fees to
defend against groundless motions." fAppellant brief
! p5.] Appellee believes this is true.
Whether this appeal is brought for more than
annoyance or not, the Appellee has been put under
the obligation of responding thereto. Defendant a pi· pellant should reasonably bear the burden he thus
· caused appellee.
This Honorable Court may determine whether
counsel fees should be awarded to appellee, and may
' allow costs of appeal to appellee, such as filing fees,
printing costs and the like.
Dahlberg v. Dahlberg 77 U 157, 292 P 214

CONCLUSION
The trial court's Order dismissing Defendant
appellant's motion to modify the instant divorce decree should be affirmed.
Plaintiff appellee should be granted reasonable
attorney's fees and costs herein incurred, including
actual printing costs.
Respectfully,
Oscar W. McConkie, Jr.
336 Sou th Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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